HOPE Day 2 - Shenanigans & Crypto
Posted by Eric Stein - July 23, 2006 CE @ 17:22:35 UTC
Scatterchat was announced at HOPE yesterday. It's been covered by Slashdot, which was somewhat surprising to me. If wifi had worked in my room last night, I could have been slashdotted. That's just as well, I suppose. I like my server in a non-melty state.
Speaking of publication of news relating to HOPE, a speaker at a panel I was about to attend was arrested before he could present. What for, we don't know yet. I'm sure it had nothing to do with the unmarked suitcase I handed off to him in the lower lobby at 4 AM... yeah, nothing to do with that. The anonymous man who gave me $450 to pass it off seemed trustworthy to me.
Before going to the talk on the construction of the Scatterchat crypto protocol, I signed up to be a developer for the program at the Hacktivismo table. Honestly, I only did because they were giving away free cookies.
The protocol looks somewhat strong, and appears to cover most of what someone would want, but the one feature that would make it really secure is off the record messaging. There is no privision for plausible deniability that you did say what was recorded (although this doesn't matter if neither computer is seized by an unfriendly party).
Another problem I have with the protocol is that it was developed by one man - unless several (at least) experts on cryptography have expressed satisfaction with its security, I don't trust it. But as far as my amateur knowledge extends, it appears to work and have a reasonable level of security.
Speaking of publication of news relating to HOPE, a speaker at a panel I was about to attend was arrested before he could present. What for, we don't know yet. I'm sure it had nothing to do with the unmarked suitcase I handed off to him in the lower lobby at 4 AM... yeah, nothing to do with that. The anonymous man who gave me $450 to pass it off seemed trustworthy to me.
Before going to the talk on the construction of the Scatterchat crypto protocol, I signed up to be a developer for the program at the Hacktivismo table. Honestly, I only did because they were giving away free cookies.
The protocol looks somewhat strong, and appears to cover most of what someone would want, but the one feature that would make it really secure is off the record messaging. There is no privision for plausible deniability that you did say what was recorded (although this doesn't matter if neither computer is seized by an unfriendly party).
Another problem I have with the protocol is that it was developed by one man - unless several (at least) experts on cryptography have expressed satisfaction with its security, I don't trust it. But as far as my amateur knowledge extends, it appears to work and have a reasonable level of security.
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